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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in the
case of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, that the state of
California's attempt to restrict children's access to violent video games
violated the First Amendment's free speech clause. Three days later,
comedian Jon Stewart, known for his political commentary and satire,
attacked the decision on The Daily Show, Stewart's aptly named talk
show. After playing a clip from the video game Mortal Kombat, which
depicted two men holding a woman by each leg while unceremoniously
ripping her in half from groin to skull as her blood and organs splattered
onto the screen, Stewart explained to the disgusted audience that "the
Supreme Court has ruled 7-2 that the state of California has no interest
in restricting the sale of this game to children. But, if while being disem-
* Member, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Miami
School of Law; B.A., 2011, University of Michigan. A special thank you to Professor Elizabeth
Iglesias for her comments and insight in an earlier draft of this Note. I am also grateful to Jessica
Johnson and the University of Miami Law Review Editorial Board for their feedback during the
editing process.
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boweled, this woman were to suffer, perhaps, a nip slip, regulate
away!"'
Unfortunately, Stewart's analysis of Brown is quite accurate.
Although he brings up the case primarily to generate laughs, the mes-
sage he sends is clear: Our First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved
into something peculiar. The First Amendment shuns modest forms of
sexual content (e.g., nudity) but embraces gratuitous violence to an
absurd degree. Brown is the latest affirmation of this inconsistency. In
line with Stewart's critique, Justice Stephen Breyer opined in his dis-
sent: "But what sense does it make to forbid selling to a thirteen year old
boy a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a sale
to that thirteen year old of an interactive video game in which he
actively, but virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills
her?"2 Justice Breyer's emotional plea did not persuade his colleagues,
but it effectively highlights what he refers to as an "anomaly" in First
Amendment jurisprudence.3
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association held that a Califor-
nia statute that placed restrictions on the sale or rental of violent video
games to minors was unconstitutional.4 Justice Antonin Scalia, writing
for a majority of the Court, found that video games were protected
speech under the First Amendment, that violent video games did not
meet any of the recognized exceptions (i.e., obscenity, incitement, fight-
ing words) to free-speech protection, that new categories of unprotected
speech may not be added, and that California did not produce enough
evidence to show that the law was justified by a compelling government
interest.' Central to the case's disposition was the majority's rejection of
California's argument that violent video games should be included under
the obscenity exception to free-speech protection. Arguing that the
obscenity exception only applies to sexual materials, not violence, Jus-
tice Scalia placed the burden on the state of California to prove that the
law was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
Unable to do so, the state of California's game was over.
This Note will analyze and critique the strategy California used to
defend its video-game legislation. Arguing that the Supreme Court
1. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast June 30, 2011),
available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-june-30-2011 /moral-kombat; see also
Margaret E. Jennings, Note, Blood, Brains, and Bludgeoning, But Not Breasts: An Analysis and
Critique of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 32 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 87, 120
(2012).
2. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2771 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2729 (majority opinion).
5. Id.
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should have ruled in its favor, this Note will then posit an alternative
tactic that future states could use in defending laws similar to the one in
Brown. Part II will provide a background, tracing the history of video-
game legislation up until 2005, when the California law was passed. Part
III will discuss the procedural history of the case, starting with the pre-
enforcement challenge, the opinion of the District Court, and the review
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Part IV will outline the Supreme
Court's majority opinion, as well as Justice Alito's concurrence and Jus-
tice Breyer's dissent. Part V will critique the arguments presented, the
Supreme Court's majority opinion and will then argue how two alterna-
tive strategies may prove successful in the future. Part VI will offer con-
cluding thoughts.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Video Games and the Law
Video games first gained widespread popularity in the 1970s, in the
form of video arcades. 6 But early games played on these arcade systems
were primitive and lacked expressive content. For example, the game
PONG, widely heralded as one of the most successful arcade games,
simply required the player to move a joystick to hit a circle across a two-
dimensional screen.
Because of their rudimentary and unsophisticated content, these
early games were not classified as speech under the First Amendment.'
In Showplace v. City of New York, one of the earliest video game cases,
a district court in New York determined that video games do not convey
information or communicate any ideas and were therefore not analogous
to motion pictures or books, which express ideas and affect viewers'
attitudes and behavior.' Accordingly, the Showplace Court held that
video games did not qualify for First Amendment protection.' 0 Local
governments were thus free to regulate video arcades without fear of
encroaching upon free speech rights.
The Showplace precedent continued throughout the 1980s. Courts
were reluctant to grant video games any degree of First Amendment
protection. In one example, a Massachusetts court upheld a town's com-
6. Garrett Mathew-James Mott, Comment, Game Over for Regulating Violent Video
Games? The Effect of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n on First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 45 Loy. L.A. L. RaV. 633, 637 (Winter 2012) (explaining that early public video
arcades were not considered to have expressive content and thus were not viewed by courts as
speech).
7. Id. at 638.
8. Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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plete eradication of video arcades (dubbed "coin activated amusement
machines"), rejecting arguments that the prohibition was an unreason-
able restraint on expression or that it violated due process and equal
protection guarantees." Lesser, albeit significantly debilitating, restric-
tions on video arcades were upheld in other jurisdictions.' 2
The 1990s saw the emergence of the video-game console, a home-
gaming device that allowed players to play video games directly on their
television sets.' 3 Video arcades still existed, but the advent of the con-
sole began to drastically alter the video-game industry and the governing
law. No longer were gamers subject to the time, place, and manner
restrictions of video arcades;' 4 gamers could now play video games in
the comfort of their own homes whenever they desired.
The content of the video games also began to change. Simple
games like PONG" were replaced by more technologically advanced
games such as Super Mario Brothers and DOOM. These new games
involved real-time strategy, conveyed storylines, and placed the gamer
in a first-person narrative role.' 6 But courts were not so quick to
embrace these technological breakthroughs as evidence of a new
medium deserving of First Amendment protection. Courts acknowl-
edged that video games were becoming more expressive, but they were
also confused by the new technology,' 7 and they often circumvented the
question of whether these new expressive elements entitled video games
to free speech protection." Nevertheless, this "inability to fully compre-
hend the video games of the 1990s"19 signaled a shift in judicial attitude.
Although courts were not yet embracing video games as speech, they
were certainly softening previous rulings and opening the door for future
11. Marshfield Family Skateland v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Mass. 1983)
(holding that a total ban on video arcades was a valid exercise of the city's police power).
12. See Playtime Games, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 535 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Caswell v.
Licensing Comm. for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1983); Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. Dep't of
Consumer Affairs of City of N.Y., 464 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Malden Amusement
Co. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297 (D. Mass. 1983).
13. Michael Poh, Evolution of Home Video Game Consoles: 1967-2011, HONGKIAT.COM,
http://www.hongkiat.com/blog/evolution-of-home-video-game-consoles-1967-2011/ (last visited
Mar. 13, 2014).
14. See Rothner v. Chicago, 929 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that video games did not
qualify for First Amendment protection, but that even if they did, an ordinance banning school
children from playing them during school hours was a valid time, place, and manner restriction to
prevent truancy).
15. See supra text accompanying note 7.
16. Edwin Evans-Thirlwell, Feature: The History of First-Person Shooters, VIDEo GAMES
DAILY (Oct. 26, 2009), http://videogamesdaily.com/features/200910/feature-the-history-of-first-
person-shooters/.
17. Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303; see also Mott, supra note 6, at 639.
18. Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303.
19. Id.
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courts to do so as well. 20
The single most important pre-Brown video-game case was decided
on March 23, 2001, when Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held in American Amusement Machine v. Kendrick
that some video games qualified for First Amendment protection. 21 Like
Brown, Kendrick involved an ordinance that restricted minors' access to
violent video games.22 The ordinance required that the operator of five
or more video-game machines in one place (video arcades) ensure a par-
ent or guardian accompanied minors who wished to play violent
games. In addition, the ordinance required that there be a partition
around such games to shield them from other non-violent games. 24 And
finally, violent video games had to have warning labels that apprised
users of the violent content contained therein.25
The Kendrick Court declared some video games to be "speech"
within the meaning of the First Amendment: 26 "Without any attempt to
address artistic merit, the court finds that the visual art and the descrip-
tion of the action-adventure games in the record support plaintiffs' con-
tention that at least some video games contain protected expression. "27
However, the Kendrick Court noted that this did not automatically enti-
tle certain games to full First Amendment protection.28 The court
accepted the city's argument that violent video games should fall within
the obscenity exception 29 of the First Amendment.30 The Court found
that the city had legitimate reasons to be concerned that violent games
could cause harm to children." And those legitimate reasons, the court
20. Id.
21. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
22. Id. at 573.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 574.
27. Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 952 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
28. Id. at 954 ("The conclusion that at least some video games are protected by the First
Amendment does not mean the city is powerless to regulate graphic violence in the games offered
to children.").
29. Attempts to regulate speech are presumptively invalid because the First Amendment
guarantees freedom of expression to the people. To rebut the presumption, the regulation must
pass the strict scrutiny test, a near insurmountable burden that requires the government to show
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. However, if a
regulation seeks to regulate a certain kind of unprotected speech, such as obscene speech, fighting
words, or incitement (yelling "fire" in a movie theater), the government is only required to show
that the regulation is rationally related to its legitimate state interest, a much lower burden than
strict scrutiny. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n,
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
30. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 972-75.
31. Id. at 946 (arguing that the city did not have to establish that violent video games actually
915
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continued, did not have to meet the strict scrutiny standard because "the
Supreme Court has recognized that psychological protection of children
is a compelling interest even without such definitive proof of actual
harm."3 2 Critics claimed that such a move upset decades of obscenity
precedent, which historically was limited to sexual content. 3 But the
court saw no principled, constitutional distinction between violence and
sex, and consequently determined that certain violent video games could
be regulated like other obscene materials. 34 Therefore, the Kendrick
Court concluded that the ordinance was a valid restriction on the First
Amendment because it was carefully tailored to address obscene mate-
rial that posed potential harm to children."
However, the Kendrick Court's opinion is largely meaningless. The
decision was appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and
Judge Richard Posner, writing for a majority of the court, reversed. First,
Judge Posner did not directly address the threshold question whether
video games contained enough expressive content to qualify as "first
amendment speech" like the District Court did. He simply expressed
agreement with the District Court judge.3 6 From there, Judge Posner
then determined that the ordinance was not a valid restriction on free
speech rights because violence was outside the boundary of the obscen-
ity exception." And because violent content was not a recognized
exception to the general ban on content-based speech regulations, the
ordinance was invalid unless it met the strict scrutiny standard of
review.38 After dismissing the evidence of harm as tenuous, Judge Pos-
ner determined that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest and therefore did not meet the strict
scrutiny test for constitutional validity.39 The ordinance, therefore, was
held to be invalid.
Central to the Seventh Circuit's disposition was the manner in
which the state of Indiana attempted to place violence into the obscenity
exception. As Judge Posner wrote, "The main worry about obscenity,
caused harm to minors, but rather just had to show that there was a reasonable basis to believe that
the restriction would aid in the city's compelling interest in preserving the welfare of minors).
32. Id. at 955 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-42 (1968) (upholding
restriction on distribution of nude magazine to minors despite conflicting evidence on the actual
harms posed by such magazines)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 946-47.
35. Id. at 944.
36. Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Most
of the video games in the record of this case, games that the City believes violates its ordinances,
are stories.").
37. Id. at 574.
38. Id. at 576-79.
39. Id.
916 [Vol. 68:911
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the main reason for its proscription, is not that it is harmful, which is the
worry behind the Indianapolis ordinance, but that it is offensive."40 Indi-
ana attempted to declare violent video games obscene because they were
harmful to children.4 1 But as Judge Posner explained, obscenity is deter-
mined not by the harm to society, but rather by the material's offensive-
ness to community norms: "Offensiveness is the offense."4 2 Indiana
thus attempted to pigeonhole violence into obscenity without entirely
understanding the underpinnings of such a classification. However, even
if the Indiana lawyers had attempted to declare violence as obscene
because it was offensive to community norms, they likely still would
have faced resistance due to the nature of the games in the record, which
were rather unrealistic and cartoon-like.4 3 However, Judge Posner left
open the possibility for a different ruling in the future: "If the games
used actors and simulated real death and mutilation convincingly, or if
the games lacked any story line and were merely animated shooting gal-
leries . . . a more narrowly drawn ordinance might survive a constitu-
tional challenge.""
It was against this backdrop that California Senator Leland Yee
attempted to address video-game regulation in his home state. Dissatis-
fied with the direction of court rulings like Kendrick, along with the self-
regulatory system of video games and the Entertainment Software Rat-
ings Board, Senator Yee sought out to change the status quo.
B. The Entertainment Software Ratings Board
The Entertainment Software Ratings Board ("ESRB") is a private,
non-profit, self-regulatory organization that provides content ratings for
video games and mobile applications, enforces advertising and market-
ing guidelines for the video game industry, and helps companies imple-
ment responsible online privacy practices.4 5 Founded in 1994, the ESRB
provides content ratings for video games much like the Motion Picture
Association of America provides content ratings for movies. The
ESRB rating is merely a guide; it is not a mandate, and retail stores and
consumers alike are free to make their own decisions without experienc-
40. Id. at 574.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 575.
43. Id. at 579.
44. Id.
45. ESRB Ratings Process, ENTM'T SOFTWARE RATINGS BD., http://www.esrb.org/ratings/
ratings.process.jsp (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
46. Doug Gross, The 10 Biggest Violent Video Game Controversies, CNN (June 29, 2011,
12:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/gaming.gadgets/06/29/violent.video.games/index.
html.
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ing any legal consequences."7 Video games are not required to receive a
rating from the ESRB, but it has become a standard industry practice for
manufacturers to seek an ESRB rating before placing their games on
retail shelves.48
According to its Web site, the ESRB rates video games by review-
ing a DVD that the game's publisher submits. Three or more "raters"
review the DVD to ensure that the game content on the DVD is consis-
tent with an ESRB questionnaire that the video-game publisher has
already submitted. After determining that the DVD is an accurate por-
trayal of the actual gameplay, the raters assign the game one of six pos-
sible content ratings: Early Childhood ("EC"), Everyone ("E"),
Everyone 10 years of age and older ("E10+"), Teen ("T"), Mature
("M"), and Adults Only ("AO")."9 The raters submit their rating to the
rest of the ESRB staff, who check the rating to see if it is consistent with
rating precedents. Once the staff approves the rating, it is submitted to
the video-game publisher, who can either accept the rating or revise the
game content and resubmit it to the ESRB, in which case the process
would start anew.5 o
The ratings are displayed on the packaging of the game itself, and
some retailers provide in-store signage (provided by the ESRB) that
explains the differences between each rating.5 I Thus, the ratings are pri-
marily used to educate consumers about the game's content and are not
designed to compel or restrict the consumer from making his or her own
choice." However, the ESRB does encourage retailers to verify the age
of minors before they buy a video game."
The ESRB claims that it sanctions retailers who sell inappropriate
games to minors or who submit misleading DVDs for testing.5 4 Such
sanctions include points, fines, product recall, and contractually "man-
dated corrective actions."5 However, the effectiveness of this enforce-
ment mechanism was called into question after an industry review
performed by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in 2004. In a
report to Congress concerning video-game industry practices, the FTC
explained that although the ESRB had made progress, there remained
47. ESRB Ratings Process, supra note 45.
48. Id.
49. Id. Teen is designed for those aged 13 and older. Mature is designed for those 17 and
older. Adults Only is designed only for those over age 18.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
918 [Vol. 68:911
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room for improvement. 5 6 For example, many questioned the indepen-
dence of the ratings board as a substantial portion of its members and
much of its funding comes from industry sources." These critics sug-
gested that the ESRB may assign less restrictive ratings than warranted
because of economic pressures exerted by members of the industry.
Specifically, these detractors pointed to the fact that most retailers will
not stock "Adults Only"-rated games, creating an incentive for the
ESRB to give such games a less restrictive content rating.
Furthermore, the FTC report explained that marketing of "M"-rated
games (those games suggested for players over 17 years of age) was
heavily focused on television shows with a young teen audience and
Internet sites with frequent teen visitors.6 0 The ESRB prohibits market-
ing of "M"-rated games on television shows with a thirty-five percent or
more under-17 audience. But the FTC reported that the thirty-five per-
cent standard, in practice, cuts off very few shows popular with teens,
and thus does little to minimize young teens' exposure to "M"-rated
game advertisements.6" The ESRB, naturally, denied any malice or
wrongdoing.
C. Senator Leland Yee's Assembly Bill 1179
Due in part to the perceived shortcomings of the ESRB, California
Senator Leland Yee introduced Assembly Bill 1179 into the state legis-
lature in 2005. The bill created a statute designed to restrict the sale of
violent video games to children. It was specifically designed to with-
stand any constitutional challenge.6 2 The law did not ban violent video
games. It did not prohibit minors from possessing or playing them, nor
did it place restrictions on adults. Rather, it simply restricted the sale or
rental to children: "As such, the law operated in the same manner as
laws restricting the sale of cigarettes, guns, ammunition and pornogra-
phy to children."63
The California legislature made significant findings of fact to sup-
port the law's passage. Senator Yee, the author of the bill and former
child psychologist, was adamant that violent video games significantly
56. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REPORT TO
CONGREss 20-29 (July 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/07/040708kidsviolencerpt.
pdf.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See discussion infra pp. 14-16.
63. Jennings, supra note 1, at 99.
919
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
harmed children and was determined to enact legislation to address the
perceived problem. As justification for the law, Assembly Bill 1179
stated that
(a) Exposing minors to depictions of violence in video games, includ-
ing sexual and heinous violence, makes those minors more likely to
experience feelings of aggression, to experience a reduction of activ-
ity in the frontal lobes of the brain, and to exhibit violent antisocial or
aggressive behavior.
(b) Even minors who do not commit acts of violence suffer psycho-
logical harm from prolonged exposure to violent video games.
(c) The state has a compelling interest in preventing violent, aggres-
sive, and antisocial behavior, and in preventing psychological or neu-
rological harm to minors who play violent video games. 4
Codified in California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5, the bill
was signed into law by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger on October 7,
2005.65 To specify which games would be placed under the law's
umbrella, and to avoid constitutional challenges for being unnecessarily
vague, the term "violent" was defined as the following:
A video game in which the range of options available to a player
includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an
image of a human being, if those acts are depicted in the game in a
manner that does either of the following:
(A) Comes within all of the following descriptions:
(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find
appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors.
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community
as to what is suitable for minors.
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors.
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images
of human beings or characters with substantially human characteris-
tics in a manner which is especially heinous, cruel, or depraved in
that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to the victim.6 6
Also to avoid constitutional challenges for vagueness, the legisla-
ture specifically defined terms such as "cruel," 67 "depraved,"6 8 "tor-
64. Assemb. B. 1179 Ch. 638 (Cal. 2005).
65. Nich Maragos, Yee, Schwarzenegger Respond to ESAIVDSA Lawsuit, GAMASUTRA (Oct.
18, 2005), http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/news-index.php?story=6884#.UPCaQI5Dw20.
66. CAL. CfV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2011).
67. "Cruel" means that the player intends to virtually inflict a high degree of pain by torture
or serious physical abuse of the victim. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1746(d)(2) (West 2011).
68. "Depraved" means that the player relishes the virtual killing or shows indifference to the
suffering of the victim, as evidenced by torture or serious physical abuse of the victim. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1746(d)(2) (West 2011).
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ture,"6 9  "heinous,""0  and "serious physical abuse."71 ,7 2  Section
1746(d)(3) provides further clarification by explaining that "[p]ertinent
factors in determining whether a killing depicted in a video game is
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved include infliction of gratuitous
violence upon the victim beyond that necessary to commit the killing,
needless mutilation of the victim's body, and helplessness of the
victim." 7
It should be noted that this language was chosen meticulously. In
fact, the text of Section 1746(d)(l)(A)(i)-(iii) mirrors the obscenity stan-
dard analyzed in the 1973 case of Miller v. California.74 The three-prong
test, commonly known as the Miller test, is used to assess whether mate-
rial is obscene and thus unprotected by the First Amendment. It asks,
(a) Whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by appli-
cable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Section 1746(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) is identical to the Miller test in
almost every regard, save for a few words. In the first prong, the words
"prurient interest" are replaced by "deviant or morbid interest of
minors." The second prong is amended to replace "sexual content spe-
cifically defined by applicable state law" with "prevailing standards in
the community as to what is suitable for minors," while the third prong
remains unchanged.
This deliberate word choice clearly reveals California's strategy.
69. "Torture" includes mental as well as physical abuse of the victim. In either case, the
virtual victim must be conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted; and the player must
specifically intend to virtually inflict severe mental or physical pain or suffering upon the victim,
apart from killing the victim. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(2) (West 2011).
70. "Heinous" means shockingly atrocious. For the killing depicted in a video game to be
heinous, it must involve additional acts of torture or serious physical abuse of the victim as set
apart from other killings. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(2) (West 2011).
71. "Serious physical abuse" means a significant or considerable amount of injury or damage
to the victim's body which involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical
pain, substantial disfigurement, or substantial impairment of the function of a bodily member,
organ, or mental faculty. Serious physical abuse, unlike torture, does not require that the victim be
conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted. However, the player must specifically intend the
abuse apart from the killing. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(2) (West 2011).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(2) (West 2011).
73. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1746(d)(3) (West 2011).
74. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (explaining the three-prong test for determining if material is to be
considered obscene speech).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra text accompanying note 65 and note 75.
2014]1 921
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The state knew that the law would be challenged and fastened to defend
it under an obscenity for minors defense, also known as the variable
obscenity defense, successfully used in Ginsberg v. New York.18 As will
be conceded in subsequent sections 9 , this strategy, although ultimately
not successful, was not entirely misguided.
III: PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF BROWN v. ENTERTAINMENT
MERCHANTs AssoCIATION
Before delving into the merit of the legal tactics exercised in
Brown, it is first necessary to place Brown in its proper context, by
examining the procedural history of the case. The novelty of Brown goes
beyond the substantive First Amendment implications. In fact, many
Supreme Court scholars considered Brown a fascinating case rife with
procedural irregularities and unusual judicial alliances.so Indeed, Brown
was considered by some as the "most surprising decision of the term."8
The First Amendment implications are naturally the most important
aspects of the decision. However, they cannot be fully understood with-
out a detailed analysis of the process leading up to the decision.
A. The Pre-Enforcement Challenge, Standing, and the
District Court Opinion
Not a single video game in California ever became subject to the
law as its opponents filed a pre-enforcement challenge, effectively sub-
jecting the law to a constitutional challenge before it ever got a chance
to operate.8 2 Opponents of the law, labeled the Video Game Software
Dealers Association ("VSDA") and the Entertainment Software Associ-
ation ("ESA"), were two groups "who describe themselves as associa-
tions of companies in the video game industry."" On October 17, 2005,
just ten days after Governor Schwarzenegger signed the bill, the trade
78. 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (using rational basis review to uphold a New York statute which
made it illegal to sell "girlie" magazines to minors). A point of elaboration is in order here.
Ginsberg is significant for purposes of Brown because it deals specifically with speech directed at
minors. Citing the state's interest in aiding parental authority and protecting children from harm,
Ginsberg allowed New York to regulate speech considered obscene as to minors but not obscene
as to adults by subjecting such regulation to a more lenient standard: rational basis review. The
question that Ginsberg did not squarely answer, however, is how spacious is the category of
speech that is "obscene-as-to-minors-but-not-adults."
79. See infra Part V.
80. David G. Post, Sex, Lies, and Videogames: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association, 2011 CATO. SUP. CT. REV. 27 (2011).
81. Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court Scoreboard, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 13,
2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/a-supreme-court-score-card/.
82. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
83. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d. 1034, 1037 (N.D.
Cal. 2005).
2014] AVOIDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S CROSSHAIRS
associations filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the statute, as well as a declaratory judgment to
declare the law "void and of no force and effect."84 On December 21,
2005, District Judge Ronald Whyte granted the preliminary injunction,
effectively placing the enforcement of the law on hold until the constitu-
tional issues were properly adjudicated. In seeking a more permanent
solution, a declaration that the law was unconstitutional, the plaintiffs
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment.
In their motion for summary judgment, the VSDA and ESA
claimed that video games were subject to First Amendment protection
and that the California law was an impermissible regulation on the con-
tent of speech." Such a regulation, the plaintiffs contended, must be
subject to the highest standard of free speech protection: strict scrutiny."
They argued that the law must be narrowly tailored and justified by a
compelling government interest. The VSDA and ESA claimed that the
law failed in both respects."
First, the plaintiffs attacked the law's supposed compelling govern-
ment interest; namely, protecting children from harm by limiting their
access to violent video game content." The plaintiffs believed that there
was insufficient evidence to draw a causal or correlative link between
violent video games and violent behavior.90 For every psychological
study that supported such a link, the plaintiffs claimed that there was a
conflicting study that reached the opposite conclusion.9
Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the law was not the least restric-
tive means of achieving the purported goal.92 The plaintiffs argued that
educational efforts, parental controls, and retailer enforcement initia-
tives,93 such as the ESRB, were better-tailored approaches that dealt
with the perceived problem more appropriately. 94
Thirdly, the plaintiffs attacked the language of the law, calling it
"unconstitutionally vague."95 As applied to video games, they claimed
84. Complaint, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d. 1034
(N.D. Cal. 2005), (No. C 05-4188), 2005 WL 2897373.
85. Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (No. C
05-4188).
86. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-8, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188 RMW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id. at 13.
90. Id. at 16.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id. at 22-24.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 26-28.
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that the law would result in a substantial degree of confusion among
video-game publishers, retailers, and customers. Such confusion, they
alleged, stemmed from the law's inadequate definition of terms and
phrases such as "violent," "deviant or morbid interest," "gratuitous vio-
lence," "image of a human being," "virtually inflict a high degree of
pain," and "shockingly atrocious."9 6 Such ambiguity, the plaintiffs
argued, would negatively affect video-game publishers, who would be
forced to guess at the meaning and scope of the law." This would
deliver a chilling effect on the expression of the plaintiffs' members.9 8
Defendants, the state of California, denied the allegations in the
plaintiffs' complaint and summary judgment motion and thereafter filed
competing motions. First, the state asserted that the VSDA and ESA did
not have standing to assert the rights at issue. Interestingly, this claim
contains some merit, but the district court did not give it much atten-
tion.99 The law does not seek to regulate the publication of video games.
Indeed, there is nothing in the law that prohibits the creation of a violent
video game. Rather, the law regulates the free speech rights of a certain
class of buyers (minors) by amending the relationship between buyers
and sellers." In such cases, the vendor can only assert standing on
behalf of the buyer under third party, or jus tertii standing.1 'o There are
three factors to consider in granting such standing: (1) whether there is
an injury in fact to a party; (2) whether a close relationship exists
between the litigant and the third party; and (3) whether some obstacle
impedes the third party from asserting his or her own rights in the
matter. 102
The VSDA and ESA satisfied the first prong of the test because the
financial penalty for violations of the act is an "injury." However, the
second and third prongs were not so clearly satisfied. Prior to Brown
there was no precedent that established a close relationship between ven-
dors and minor children. Only parents,103 schools and teachers,104 and
medical providers' 0 5 could assert the rights of minors as third parties.'
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See generally Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 05 4188 RMW,
2007 WL 2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
100. See Jennings, supra note 1, at 117.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989)).
103. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
104. See e.g., Nicholson v. Bd. of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 638 F.2d 858 (1982).
105. See e.g., Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 390 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004).
106. Jennings, supra note 1, at 117 (arguing that the plaintiffs in Brown did not have standing
to assert the free-speech rights of children).
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Therefore, allowing the VSDA and ESA, vendors, to assert the rights of
minors effectively set a new precedent for jus tertii standing never
before seen.10 7
To counter the plaintiffs' substantive claims, the state of California
argued that the law passes a strict scrutiny analysis. The state explained
that the compelling government interest was not simply to restrict a
child's access to violent material, but rather to aid parents in the
upbringing of their child. 1 s "The Supreme Court recognizes that par-
ents, not society, are entitled to choose the appropriate material for their
individual children to view or hear. And parents are entitled to the assis-
tance of state laws in this battle.""9 Because the law did not prohibit
minors from viewing violent games, but rather deferred to parents to
make that decision, the state argued the law appropriately served a com-
pelling government interest."i 0
The state also fired back at the plaintiffs' attack on the scientific
validity of psychological studies performed to assess the impact of vio-
lent games on children's behavior. California pointed to numerous stud-
ies indicating both correlative and causal links."' Citing twenty-three
articles by prominent social scientists"l2 that explain the negative effects
of violent video games on children, California contended that the record
was proof of the legislature's due diligence in researching the issue." 3
The studies purportedly show that violent video games not only lead to
aggressive behavior, but they also lead to a desensitization to violence,
as well as decreased activity in the frontal lobes, or cognition centers, of
the undeveloped child's brain:" 4 "Automatic aggressiveness, increased
aggressive thoughts and behavior, antisocial behavior, desensitization,
poor school performance, reduced activity in the frontal lobes of the
brain-each represents a distinct harm to the minds of children. And
prevailing social science points directly to violent video games as a
major culprit."'
The state admitted that the studies do not demonstrate absolute cer-
107. Id.
108. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Video Software Dealers Ass'n v.
Schwarzenegger, No. C 05 4188 RMW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 8-15.
112. Such studies include research by Dr. Craig A. Anderson, PhD, chair of the Psychology
Department of Iowa State University, as well as support from the American Academy of
Pediatrics, the California Psychiatric Association, and the Indiana University School of Medicine.
113. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 15.
114. Id. at 8-15.
115. Id. at 12.
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tainty." 6 However, the state also pointed out that the courts generally
give deference to legislative determinations.'II Citing Turner Broadcast-
ing System, Inc. v. F.C.C.," California correctly explained that the First
Amendment does not require absolute certainty: "All that is required is
that the legislative body consider the available evidence, and draw rea-
sonable inferences from the evidence considered.""' And courts must
"accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments" of the
legislature.12 0
After arguing the validity of the compelling government purpose,
the state of California turned its attention to the second element of strict
scrutiny analysis: whether the act was narrowly tailored to advance its
purported goal. At the outset, the state clarified that its intent was not to
prevent children from harming others, but rather to prevent harm to chil-
dren's cognitive development.1 21 With this narrow goal in mind, the
state argued that the means to achieve it were equally narrow for four
distinct reasons.
First, the state argued that the act was narrowly tailored because it
only addressed video games and not other forms of violent media.
Although other forms of violent media can also have effects on a child's
cognitive development, the state explained that video games have a
much higher potential of harm because of their uniquely interactive
nature.122 To support this assertion, the state pointed to various studies
conducted by professional medical associations,123 which showed that
violent video games posed a special risk.124 "And according to the
American Psychological Association, violent video games may be more
harmful than violent television and movies because they are interactive,
very engrossing, and require the player to identify with the aggres-
sor . . . ."125 Therefore, the law is narrowly tailored because it only
regulates violent video games, and not other forms of media, which are
not as harmful.
Second, the state argued that the law was narrowly tailored because
116. Id. at 13-15.
117. Id. at 14.
118. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
119. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 14 (citing Turner, 512
U.S. at 666).
120. Id. at 14.
121. Id. at 12 ("in the instant case, California is seeking to prevent harm to minors, not to
prevent them from committing violent acts.").
122. Id. at 15-16.
123. Such associations included the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the California
Psychiatric Association.
124. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 16.
125. Id. at 16.
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the language that defined the relevant games to be regulated (which was
charged by the plaintiffs as confusing and unconstitutionally vague) 126
was purposefully chosen to apply to only a small subset of games.127
Third, the law did not prohibit minors from buying, renting, or oth-
erwise possessing violent video games. It simply required that they do
so with parental permission. And the law did nothing to impede an
adult's access to such games. This feature of the law, California argued,
ensured that the law was specifically limited to children whose parents
did not want them playing violent games and was thus narrowly tailored
to serve its purpose of assisting parental authority. 128
The final reason cited is that less restrictive means, such as the self-
regulatory regime exemplified by the ESRB, had proven ineffective.129
Citing studies by the Federal Trade Commission, the state explained
how the ESRB rating system failed. In one such study, conducted in
2003, 69% of unaccompanied 13-16 year olds purchased "M"-rated
games, and only 24% of cashiers asked the youth's age.130 With such
dismal statistics, the state argued, it was proper for the legislature to step
in and replace the failed system of industry self-regulation.
With summary judgment motions to consider from each side, Dis-
trict Court Judge Whyte ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, turning the pre-
liminary injunction into a permanent one and effectively holding that the
law was facially unconstitutional. 3 1 Judge Whyte applied the strict scru-
tiny analysis that the plaintiffs requested. 132 He found that the interest to
be protected, that of protecting minors from harm, was a compelling
one, worthy of governmental action. However, Judge Whyte did not
agree that the law was narrowly tailored to serve such a purpose. 3 The
court noted weaknesses in the psychological studies proffered by Cali-
fornia's expert witness, Dr. Craig Anderson, and showed skepticism
towards research suggesting a causal link between violent video games
and cognitive harm. For example, Judge Whyte was troubled that the
law did not distinguish between minors of different ages: "The studies
cited by the state do not demonstrate that exposure to violent video
games of those nearing the age of majority has the same deleterious
effect on them, as it does, for example, on those under age fourteen."' 3 4
126. See discussion supra Part III.
127. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 16-17.
128. Id. at 17.
129. See discussion supra Part IIB.
130. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 18.
131. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C 05 4188 RMW, 2007 WL
2261546 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2007).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 10.
927
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
As a result, the law was seen as overbroad and unnecessarily general.
The ESRB, in contrast, differentiates between minors of various age
groups, and in that regard is less restrictive and more properly
tailored. 135
B. The Ninth Circuit Affirms
Vowing to continue the fight, the state of California appealed the
District Court order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This time,
however, the state slightly altered its strategy. Because the district court
was so quick to dismiss the legislative determinations regarding the link
between violence and video games, the state was skeptical that the Court
of Appeals would view the evidence with any less skepticism-espe-
cially if the strict scrutiny standard was applied again. Therefore, the
state sought to justify the law under the Ginsberg precedent, which the
state argued, allowed a legislature to pass content-based free-speech
restrictions on minors if a rational basis could be shown between the
perceived harm and the restriction. Thus, if the state could persuade the
court that Ginsberg controlled the outcome, it only needed to show that
the restriction on minors' ability to obtain violent video games was
rationally related to the state's interest in protecting them. As a signifi-
cantly lower standard than strict scrutiny, the court would be more defer-
ential to the legislative determinations that provided justification for the
law.
Unfortunately for California, the Ninth Circuit did not take the bait.
In fact, the state suffered a larger defeat. Not only did the Ginsberg
strategy fail, the court also held that the law flunked both prongs of the
strict scrutiny standard, holding that the alleged purpose was not a com-
pelling government interest."'
We hold that the act, as a presumptively invalid content-based restric-
tion on speech is subject to strict scrutiny, and not the "variable
obscenity" standard from Ginsberg v. New York. Applying strict scru-
tiny, we hold that the act violates rights protected by the First
Amendment because the state has not demonstrated a compelling
interest, has not tailored the restriction to its alleged compelling pur-
pose, and there exist less-restrictive means that would further the
State's expressed interest.'
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in April of 2010. But the
135. See discussion supra Part II.B.
136. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009).
137. Id. at 953.
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grant was perplexing.' 3  This was not the classic case of a circuit split,
or an area of law that required much clarification. The case was entirely
affirmed on appeal. The Seventh, Eight, and Ninth Circuits were all in
agreement: Content-based restrictions on video games were subject to a
strict scrutiny analysis and were, for the most part, unconstitutional
restraints on free expression. Many Court watchers were left scratching
their heads: Why did the Court agree to hear this case?' 3 9 There was
even greater speculation that the case would be groundbreaking after the
court kept delaying the issuance of its decision.' 40
However, those hoping for a dramatic realignment of First Amend-
ment law were no doubt disappointed. The Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit 7-2, although there was an interesting mix of concurring and
dissenting opinions: "But even more surprising was the lineup, which
was not only unusual but unique; in almost two decades of service
together on the Court, this was the first time, as far as I have been able to
determine, that Justices Breyer and Thomas were together, alone, in
dissent.""'
A. Justice Antonin Scalia's Majority Opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia's three-part opinion largely mirrors that of
the Ninth Circuit. In Part II (Part I provided a brief procedural history),
he rejected California's attempt to bring violence under the obscenity
umbrella.' 42 In Part III he determined that the law also failed a strict
scrutiny test.14 3
Part II begins with an exposition on free-speech law. He begins
with the general rule that the government cannot restrict expression
because of its messages, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
However, there are exceptions and Justice Scalia acknowledges three
specifically: obscenity,1"' incitement,14 6 and fighting words.14 7 The
majority then focused its attention to the instant case.
California argued the case with the same strategy it used before the
138. Andrew L. Schlafly, Game Over for Childhood? Violent Video Games as First
Amendment Speech, 38 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173, 175 (2012).
139. Post, supra note 80, at 5.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id.
142. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733-2738 (2011) (rejecting
California's invitation to include violence as part of the obscenity exception to first amendment
protection).
143. Id. at 2738-2743 (explaining how the statute fails strict scrutiny).
144. Id. at 2733 (citing Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
145. Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)).
146. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
147. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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Ninth Circuit. The state urged the Court to exempt the law from normal
First Amendment strict scrutiny and apply instead the more lenient stan-
dard applied in Ginsberg. The law deserved such treatment, the state
argued, because both Brown and Ginsberg involved state attempts to
limit speech directed at minors. And just as the New York statute in
Ginsberg was upheld under a rational basis, so too should the California
law. 148
But the majority rejected this argument, claiming United States v.
Stevens,' 49 not Ginsberg, controlled the outcome. 5 0 Stevens invalidated
a federal law that criminalized the creation, sale, or possession of depic-
tions of illegal animal cruelty, save for those depictions with literary,
artistic, religious, journalistic, political, or educational value.1"' The law
was deemed unconstitutional, the Court reasoned, because violent
expression, no matter how disgusting, has historically been protected
under the First Amendment.152 The Court explained that, historically,
only sexual material, not violent material, can qualify for the obscenity
exception.153
Justice Scalia believed that the state of California's argument in
Brown was analogous to the federal government's argument in Stevens
and consequently rejected the attempt to gain the more lenient standard
of review accorded to obscene materials.154 "As in Stevens, California
has tried to make violent-speech regulation look like obscenity regula-
tion . . . . That does not suffice. Our cases have been clear that the
obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a
legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of sexual conduct."15 5
This was a death knell to the law. Per First Amendment jurispru-
dence, the refusal to allow violent video games into the obscenity excep-
tion meant that the restriction would only be sustained if it passed a
strict scrutiny analysis. In much the same manner as the district and
appellate courts, the majority found that the regulation did not pass the
strict scrutiny test and held the law unconstitutional.156
148. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Brown v. Entertainment Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)
(No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2787546.
149. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
150. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736.
151. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1577.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736.
155. Id. at 2734 (quoting Miller v. California 413, U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
156. Id. at 2742 (Justice Scalia found that the evidence justifying the law was weak, and that
the law was both underinclusive in that it did not restrict other harmful violent media, and
overinclusive in that it restricted minors who had parents who did not care what type of video
games their children played).
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B. Justice Alito's Concurrence
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts ultimately sided with the
majority, but for a much more narrow, distinct reason. They found the
law unconstitutional because the language of the statute was "impermis-
sibly vague."'17 For the most part, they avoided the broad constitutional
questions discussed in the majority opinion.'
Justice Alito wrote that the law lacked sufficient definitions to
properly inform video-game publishers of the kinds of games that would
be subject to the law: "Here the California law does not define violent
video games with the narrow specificity that the Constitution
demands." 59 Indeed, crucial terms such as "deviant" and "morbid" are
not specifically defined in the statute, and the phrase "prevailing com-
munity standards as to what is suitable to minors" does not take into
account the vast differences between, for example, nine year olds and
seventeen year olds. It also does not serve the same limiting function as
it did in the Miller context because, he explains, violence, historically,
does not enjoy as uniform a consensus among communities as sexual
expression.16 0 Justice Alito found these factors would result in substan-
tial enforcement problems by creating confusion and inequalities among
video-game publishers, retailers, and consumers: "For all these reasons,
I would hold only that the particular law at issue here fails to provide the
clear notice that the Constitution requires." 6 1
Interestingly, Justice Alito included an extensive section in his
opinion that outlined why he did not join the majority. First, he did not
believe that Stevens controlled the outcome, citing differences in degree
between the two regulations. Stevens involved a federal law that com-
pletely prohibited a form of expression altogether-for children and
adults. Brown, on the other hand, a state law, merely requires a child to
get parental consent before buying certain video games.' 62 Second, he
disagreed with the majority's contention that the law unnecessarily
restricted children who had parents indifferent to their choice of video
games. Citing Ginsberg, Justice Alito explained that the California law
reinforced parental decision-making exactly like the New York statute
did: "Under both laws, minors are prevented from purchasing certain
materials; and under both laws, parents are free to supply their children
with these items if that is their wish."l 6 3 Thirdly, and perhaps most
157. Id. at 2742-43 (Alito, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2743.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2746.
161. Id. at 2751.
162. Id. at 2747.
163. Id.
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importantly for future regulations, Justice Alito was not as eager as the
majority to embrace video games as mere "interactive literature." 6" Jus-
tice Alito wrote that the majority did not give enough credence to the
technological capabilities, the interactivity, and the astounding realism
that separate video games from other forms of expression:165
When all of the characteristics of video games are taken into account,
there is certainly a reasonable basis for thinking that the experience
of playing a video game may be quite different from the experience
of reading a book, listening to a radio broadcast, or viewing a movie.
And if this is so, then for at least some minors, the effects of playing
violent video games may also be quite different. The Court acts pre-
maturely in dismissing this possibility out of hand.166
C. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer would have upheld the statute using what can best be
described as a modified strict scrutiny analysis. He agreed with the state
of California and wrote that Ginsberg, not Stevens, was the appropriate
precedent, but the standard he used to validate the law falls somewhere
between the rational basis used in Ginsberg and traditional strict
scrutiny.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of Justice Breyer's dissent is his
endorsement of the science backing the law's passage. As exhibited in
the two appendices he attached to his opinion, Justice Breyer wrote that
the evidence proffered by psychologists and medical associations was
substantial and compelling.'16 Even if one argued that the evidence was
not as definitive, Justice Breyer reminded the Court of the long history
of judicial deference in legislative determinations.16 8 And the law's pro-
posed restriction, he argued, was quite modest and served its stated
interests of aiding parental authority and protecting children, narrowly
and effectively."'
Moreover, Justice Breyer wrote that the evidence established that
Brown was ultimately about the protection of children, not about
whether violence should become a new category of unprotected expres-
sion. He emphasized on multiple occasions that, like the statute in Gins-
berg, the statute here was specifically designed to protect minors, and
that obscenity's historical limitation to sexual content was based upon
164. Id. at 2748-51.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1251.
167. Id. at 2767-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2770.
169. Id.
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regulations of adult expression. 70 This adult-minor distinction did not
exist in Stevens, so its use as a precedent in the instant case was mis-
placed. Justice Breyer contended that this distinction was why "Gins-
berg controls the outcome here a fortiori.""
After discussing the case pursuant to his modified strict scrutiny
analysis, in which he used somewhat of a balancing test,17 2 Justice
Breyer concluded that the law was facially constitutional and that the
Court's decision to the contrary created somewhat of a glitch in First
Amendment law.'7 3 Providing cannon fodder for Jon Stewart, Justice
Breyer quipped near the end of his dissent, "What kind of First Amend-
ment would permit the government to protect children by restricting
sales of [an] extremely violent video game only when the woman-
bound, gagged, tortured, and killed-is also topless?"
V. ANALYSIS & CRITIQUE
California had hoped that a majority of the Justices would view this
case as Justice Breyer did. Unfortunately, that did not occur, but there is
no doubt sufficient dicta within both Breyer's dissent and Alito's con-
currence to suggest that the Supreme Court could schedule a rematch.
Although Brown commanded a seven-Justice majority, the core issues of
violence, obscenity, and the standard to apply to content-based restric-
tions to minors is a much more volatile 5-4 split. 174 Some commentators
have jokingly suggested that the Brown opinions reach such differing
conclusions that it could be said each opinion came out of a different
legal system:175 "[It's as though the same statute had been presented for
consideration to the highest court in the United States, Romania,
Morocco, and Australia and these are the opinions that emerged from
that process."17 6
Brown was a victory for the video-game industry. However, the
diverse opinions suggest that this area of law is not as settled as some
may think. This is especially true when one considers, as Judge Posner,
Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts did, that video-game technology
will only improve, becoming more violent, more realistic, and more
interactive: 7 7
170. Id. at 2771.
17 1. Id.
172. See generally id. at 2767-71.
173. See supra Part I.
174. Post, supra note 80, at 51.
175. Id. at 45.
176. Id.
177. For an interesting look at the future of video game technology and the law, see Robert
Bryan Norris, Jr., It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Gets Hurt: Brown v. Entertainment
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I would not squelch legislative efforts to deal with what is perceived
by some to be a significant and developing social problem. If differ-
ently framed statutes are enacted by the States or by the Federal Gov-
ernment, we can consider the constitutionality of those laws when
cases challenging them are presented to us.'
With this understanding, it becomes useful to analyze and critique
California's strategy in Brown, as states and industry representatives
alike will no doubt try to take this game to the next level.
After a careful analysis, it can be argued that California's strategy
should have won this battle. The reason that it did not was because the
Supreme Court improperly applied Stevens to the facts when Ginsberg
was the more suitable precedent. Moreover, there is insufficient lan-
guage in Ginsberg to suggest that the "obscenity-for-minors" category
must be limited in the same manner as the "adults-only" obscenity
exception. The traditional obscenity limitations, laid down in Roth v.
United States, do not support such a judicial construction.'7 9 However,
Brown now occupies that once nonexistent precedent, so for better or
worse, a future reliance on Ginsberg would still be a difficult, uphill
battle.
Alternatively, it appears that an entirely different strategy was
available to California and will be available to states in the future.
Admittedly, it seems counter-intuitive to rely on an appellate court deci-
sion when Supreme Court precedent exists, but it is worth noting that
Judge Posner's opinion in Kendrick left open the possibility that with
increased technological innovations, video games, for purposes of
unlimited free-speech protection, may end up falling victim to their own
sword.180
A. California's Reliance on Ginsberg was not Misguided, but a
Slightly Different Tactic May Have Been More Successful
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that California's reliance
on Ginsberg was a sensible strategy that should have been met with
greater agreement. Of all the Justices, Justice Breyer was most honest to
Supreme Court precedent because Ginsberg was in fact a more appropri-
ate precedent than Stevens. As Justice Alito articulated, the effects of the
law in Ginsberg and the law in Stevens were drastically different: The
law in Stevens would have imposed more stringent restrictions across a
Merchants Association and the Problem of Interactivity, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 81 (2011); see
also Mott, supra note 6, at 650-54.
178. Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring).
179. See infra Part V.A.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
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wide variety of media with a much greater scope than both the law in
Ginsberg and the law in Brown.
First, the law in Stevens was a federal one that criminalized not
only the sale or rental of animal cruelty depictions; it also criminalized
the creation and possession of such material. Brown merely placed a
restriction on the sale or rental of a small subset of extremely violent
video games, did not encroach upon the rights of publishers to create
material, and did not seek to punish children who possessed and played
violent video games, regardless of how they acquired them. The more
important distinction, however, is that the law in Stevens applied to eve-
ryone in the entire country. Infants, grandparents, and everyone in
between were subject to the same prohibition; there was no distinction
between minors and adults. In stark contrast, the laws in Ginsberg and
Brown only affected the free-speech rights of minors. Adults in New
York were free to buy as many pornographic magazines as they wished,
just as adults in California could buy violent video games without
restrictions.
However, the trivial similarities between Ginsberg and Brown are
only enough to pull Brown away from Stevens's reach. The similarities
discussed above do not contain enough significance to merit Ginsberg
controlling precedent. This is because of an important distinction
between the content of the two regulations (sex v. violence). However,
in the future, these differences can be reconciled if it is argued that Gins-
berg is not really a case about obscenity-an argument that California
failed to fully articulate.
Ginsberg regulated sexual material aimed at minors. Brown regu-
lated violent video games aimed at minors. California's opponents
immediately distinguished these cases on the grounds that Ginsberg con-
cerned obscenity, historically limited to sexual materials, whereas
Brown concerned violent depictions, which have never been included in
the obscenity doctrine. The knee-jerk reaction of many, including Cali-
fornia, was to claim that the obscenity doctrine should be enlarged to
include such disgustingly violent material.18 1 In its brief, California
explained that laws restricting access to both sexual and violent materi-
als were motivated by identical community concerns. 18 2 Such similarity,
it argued, meant that violent material could also be considered
"obscene."183 Even though that may be an accurate statement of legisla-
tive intentions, the argument too obviously asked the court to do some-
thing quite onerous: enlarge a category of unprotected speech. For
181. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 148, at 31.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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better or for worse, obscenity has been limited to sexual material since
1957.' And in a static legal system such as ours, so profoundly com-
mitted to stare decisis, the argument to expand the obscenity category
will almost always fail, as it did in Brown.
But going forward, there may be a way to subvert the unfavorable
obscenity precedent, or at least to better conceal an attempt to expand it.
Revisiting Roth v. United States, the seminal case of modem obscenity
jurisprudence, and then juxtaposing it with Ginsberg can be used to
reframe the analysis in a light more favorable to a state defending a law
like Brown. More specifically, future states should acknowledge that
violent expression has no relation to obscenity, but also argue that Gins-
berg has no relation to the obscenity doctrine. In fact, when examined
closely, Roth suggests that Ginsberg has nothing to do with obscenity. 5
And once the Court accepts this premise, the unfavorable issue of
obscenity is removed from the calculus. The focus thus shifts from one
of sex, violence, and obscenity to the much simpler, much more
favorable one of a state's police power to aid in parental authority and to
protect children-the two stated aims of the Ginsberg and Brown laws.
Therefore, this juxtaposition of Roth and Ginsberg may provide relief
for any future state seeking to overturn the Brown precedent.' 86
Roth, decided in 1957, marked the first time the Supreme Court
held that laws regulating obscenity did not violate the First Amend-
ment.1 87 Laws against obscenity had existed since the founding of the
country; each state had its own, but in 1842, Congress began passing
federal obscenity laws. 18 There were a total of twenty by the time Roth
reached the Supreme Court.'8 9 Justice William Brennan, who would
write the Ginsberg opinion eleven years later, wrote for a majority of the
court. He held that obscenity statutes are permissible content-based reg-
ulations outside the usual protections of the First Amendment. In his
reasoning, Brennan cited to numerous federal and state court opinions,
184. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
185. Id. (explaining that obscene material is not simply material concerning sex. Obscenity
must be sexual content that appeals to prurient interests. And the scope of prurient interests are to
be judged only by reference to community norms applicable to the average citizen-men, women,
and children included); see also Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2766 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Since the Court in Ginsberg specified that the statute's prohibition
applied to material that was not obscene, I cannot dismiss Ginsberg on the ground that it
concerned obscenity.").
186. See infra text accompanying notes 189-92; see also Vincent S. Onorato, Note, Shielding
Children from Nudity but not Violence . .. Do Minors' First Amendment Rights Make Sense?, 41
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 151, 176-80 (2013) (arguing that violence should be treated as offensive
as nudity or alternatively, that the "obscenity for minors" standard should be abolished).
187. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
188. Id. at 485.
189. Id.
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state laws, and international agreements. 190 He also declared that
obscene utterances are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." 91 However, Justice Brennan proscribed parameters
to determine what actually could be considered obscene: "Obscene
material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to pru-
rient interests."l92 The portrayal of sex or nudity is not enough. Such
portrayals must give rise to immoral, lustful, indecent, depraved, or cor-
rupt behavior in order to be considered obscene.19 3 To determine
whether such portrayals actually encouraged such behaviors, Justice
Brennan explained that the test was not whether the material would
arouse such reactions in a particular segment of the community; rather,
the determination must be made with the average person in mind: "You
may ask yourselves, does it offend the common conscience of the com-
munity by present-day standards."1 94 Brennan then added that "in deter-
mining that conscience, you are to consider the community as a whole,
young and old, educated and uneducated, the religious and the irrelig-
ious-men, women and children."1 95
Roth therefore stands for the proposition that obscenity, while not a
precise concept, is sexual material that the community determines would
arouse the prurient interests of the average person-not of a particular
segment of the community. The goal of the obscenity doctrine, thus, is
not to prevent tangible harm to certain people, but rather to separate
offensive and inoffensive sexual materials. Applying this to Ginsberg, it
becomes clear that although the New York statute dealt with sexual
material, it is not an obscenity case under the traditional definition of
obscenity set forth by Roth. This is because the average person in New
York did not find "girlie" magazines to be obscene. In fact the Ginsberg
court admits that, "[t]he girlie magazines involved in the sales here are
not obscene for adults."' 96 Rather, New York targeted a particular seg-
ment of the community-minors. Roth specifically mentions that this is
not the proper way to determine obscenity."' In fact, Roth overturned a
prior obscenity test, known as the Hicklin test, which judged obscenity
"by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 486-87.
194. Id. at 490.
195. Id.
196. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634 (1968) (citing Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767 (1967)).
197. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
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persons . . . ."198
Ginsberg's divergence from traditional Roth obscenity norms is not
to render Ginsberg as a whole moot or unconstitutional. In fact, many
court observers and jurists, including the majority of the Brown Court,
contend that Ginsberg represents an evolution of the concept of obscen-
ity by creating a "sub-category" for minors.199 But this "sub-category" is
in actuality a brand new category of unprotected speech because its
asserted justifications lie not in separating offensive and inoffensive sex-
ual content, but instead with preventing harms.20 0 And as Judge Posner
articulated in Kendrick, obscenity is not about preventing harms, but
rather is concerned with offensiveness.2 0 1 But the New York statute in
Ginsberg was clearly motivated by an attempt to prevent a perceived
social harm:
[T]his Court, too, recognized that the State has an interest to protect
the welfare of children and to see that they are safeguarded from
abuses which might prevent their growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens. The only question remaining, there-
fore, is whether the New York Legislature might rationally conclude,
as it has, that exposure to the materials proscribed by s 484-h consti-
tutes such an abuse. . . . Section 484-e of the law states a legislative
finding that the material condemned by s 484-h is a basic factor in
impairing the ethical and moral development of our youth and a clear
and present danger to the people of the state.202
Because "obscene-as-to-minors" was motivated by a legislative
desire to prevent harm to a certain class of people, and not by traditional
obscenity norms regarding offensiveness, it must follow that Ginsberg,
even if accidentally, birthed a new category of speech regulation outside
the protection of the First Amendment. Although the New York statute
did regulate nude images, it does not follow that the new "obscene-as-to-
minors" exception only concerns sexual subjects. Unlike Roth, this new
category enjoyed no judicial precedents that limited it to a certain sub-
ject matter. As the first of its kind, Ginsberg thus articulated a test to
place certain speech directed at minors outside the protection of the First
Amendment if it could be shown that, like other categories of unpro-
tected expression, the speech restriction passed a rational basis
review.20 3
Under this framing of Roth and Ginsberg, a state could conceivably
198. Id. at 489.
199. Post, supra note 80, at 36.
200. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638-39.
201. See discussion supra Part II.A.
202. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640-41 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
203. Id.
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solve the obscenity conundrum and successfully argue that a statute like
Brown triggers only rational basis review. While this strategy does not
fix the anomaly in First Amendment jurisprudence, it achieves the nar-
row purpose of placing modest restrictions on a potentially harmful
product marketed to minors. By placing Ginsberg into a different con-
text, minors are better shielded from a small subset of games that even
the industry itself believes should be restricted to adults.20
B. The Alternative Strategy: Death by Technology
As the future of video games becomes rife with more realistic vio-
lence and interactive gameplay, scientific evidence may evolve to show
the causal link that the Brown majority so desperately demanded and
Justice Alito cautiously acknowledged. And in this regard, future laws
may pass strict scrutiny, possibly making Ginsberg irrelevant to the
inquiry.
If scientific evidence does evolve to show a more concrete link
between cognitive harm and violent video games, then Justice Alito's
concurrence and Judge Posner's Kendrick opinion will prove instructive.
And the likelihood of whether such scientific evidence does evolve is
tied to how interactive video games become.205 It is worth noting the
significant developments in video game technology since Senator Yee
first introduced the bill in 2005. Illuminating these improvements under-
scores just how much more rapid is the pace of technological change
than legal evolution. Like other industries, video game technology may
soon leave modem precedents in the rearview.
Violence in video games has expanded tremendously in the last two
decades. Games that were once only capable of showing primitive, 2D
graphics on a big computer screen can now be played in high definition
graphics on smartphones. 206 More recently, video-game consoles, such
as the Xbox 360, the Playstation 3, and the Nintendo 3DS now support
three-dimensional gaming, offering the gamer a stunningly realistic
visual experience.207 But the technology goes far beyond mere visual
enhancements. For example, the Microsoft Kinect, an attachment to the
Xbox 360, allows gamers to control their character's movement with the
use of their body; no hand-held controller is needed.2 08 For some games,
users can purchase controllers that are shaped or modeled after whatever
instrument the character in the game is using. For example, a gamer
204. See discussion supra Part I.B.
205. See generally Norris, Jr., supra note 177, at 101-07.
206. Id. at 84-87.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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could purchase a controller literally modeled in the relative shape and
design of a real guitar to play the aptly named game, Rock Band. In a
more violent application, players of the zombie-killing game Resident
Evil could purchase a chainsaw-shaped controller to better simulate slic-
ing through zombie hordes. 20
Video games used to involve only the visual and somatosensory
(touch) sensations. But now, a person's sense of sight, sound, touch, and
even smell can be used in game.210 And the manner in which those
senses are stimulated are becoming ever more realistic and interactive.
Indeed, the ultimate goal and effect of all the technological improve-
ments is to make video games more like real life. To the extent that
video games become more like simulators and less like games, new
precedents may need to be drawn.
To this end, it appears that the future of violent video games' free-
speech protection is not so much tied to the Brown precedent, but rather
will be a function of technological developments. Essentially then, there
is not much strategy to this alternative other than to wait for video
games to develop themselves out of First Amendment protection. Once
they reach such a level, a strict scrutiny test might be easier to pass.
Ironically, the warnings of Justice Alito could come to fruition, because
not too long ago, technology was the means by which video games first
obtained free-speech protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has spoken. Violent video games, no matter
how disturbing they may be, can be sold to children without legal conse-
quence. This Note has discussed whether this decision was proper in the
eyes of the First Amendment. It has also addressed the legal strategies
involved. It has not specifically commented on whether this decision
was sound public policy. As the Supreme Court would surely exclaim,
public policy decisions are outside the purview of the judiciary. Accord-
ingly, the wisdom of whether society should allow children unregulated
access to violent video games is outside the scope of this Note.
However, it is natural to explore the practical consequences of legal
decisions. Although the ruling was a defeat for California, it appears that
the fight did enact some reform. In a more recent FTC report on the
209. Id. at 88.
210. Martin Delgado, I Love the Smell of Napalm on My Xbox: How Computer Games of the
Future Will Simulate the Real Stench of Battle, THE DAILY MAIL (May 16, 2009, 11:22 PM), http:/
/www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article- 1183465/1-love-smell-napalm-Xbox-How-games-
future-simulate-real-stench-battle.html.
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marketing of violent entertainment to children,211 the FTC concluded
that the electronic-gaming industry's regulatory regime has become
more effective than the corresponding film (Motion Picture Association
of America) and music (Recording Industry Association of America)
regulatory regimes.212 Thus, it appears the video-game industry has
responded to criticisms and is already preparing itself for a future fight
down the road, in which the technology, and thus the stakes will no
doubt be higher.
If states wish to enact similar laws in the future, the biggest obsta-
cle they will face is the Brown decision. Even if Ginsberg is properly
juxtaposed with Roth to place it in a more favorable context, regulators
still have to surmount a judicial system unequivocally resistant to over-
turn precedents, especially when such precedents come from the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, the video-game industry must be
wary of itself. As the warnings of Justice Alito and Judge Posner
demonstrate, video games are uniquely interactive and technologically
driven. Thus, the line connecting them to books, radio, movies, plays,
and other forms of historically protected media further fades with each
passing year. And when this line vanishes, video games will be isolated
on an island, effectively becoming a much easier target for regulators.
But for now, it appears that the video game industry has won, and until
either side makes a move, this game will remain paused.
211. See 2004 FTC report, supra note 56.
212. FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REPORT TO
CONGRESs 23 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/12/P99451Iviolententertain
ment.pdf.
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